We investigate modal systems for knowledge and belief, taking as a starting point a logic that was originally introduced by Kraus and Lehmann. We derive several properties and discuss (their) consequences for the epistemic operators. Kraus and Lehmann observed that adding the axiom B,(f -+ B,K,(p to the system gives a collapse of knowledge and belief: (Kitp +* Bi<p). We investigate the cause(s) of this problem and suggest a 'similar' system that does allow the same axiom without the mentioned collapse. We consider as the main benefit of this paper, however, the techniques that arc developed to come to this solution. It appears that applying basic correspondence theory to a multi-modal system allows a systematic examination of possible combinations of epistemic operators.
Introduction
We discuss (multi modal) logics for both knowledge and belief which are to be interpreted on Kripke structures. The basic system for our discussion is introduced by Kraus and Lehmann [19] . Knowledge (K) and belief (B) are both interpreted (as necessity operators with respect to two binary relations) over Kripke structures. (For an introduction to modal logic, see [4] or [18] .) We denote their basic system with KBCD-What is interesting in KBCD is, that it does not only give notions of knowledge and belief (which on their own are rather familiar ones-see [9] or [23, 24] ), but also some interaction properties between the two (an alternative approach to have both notions in one system is to define one in terms of the other-cf. [21] or [27] ).
In the literature of philosophical logic, systems for knowledge and belief were studied in the 1960s (cf. [10] ). In the 1980s, these notions became one of the central themes in the field of AI [9] and are thus gaining their place in the field of computer science [23, 24] . It now seems conventional to take the system 55 for knowledge and weak S5 (or KD45) for belief (cf. [9, 10, 23, 24] ). To be more precise, it is customary to ascribe the following properties to belief.
One does not believe false assertions (-<B±), believers have positive-(B(p -> BBip) as well as negative introspection (~>Bip -} B-<Bip).
Knowledge should moreover also be veridical: (Kip -> (p). We will give a rather systematic classification of properties like these in Section 6.
To mould the notions into a logical system, one usually adds the inference rules modus ponens (h tp, h (p -t rp => h xp) and necessitation for K as well as B (h ip ^> r-K(p, h ip =• h Btp).
Once we have given the basic system KBCD for knowledge and belief, we investigate some of its properties. One important theme in this paper is a problem that is also mentioned in [19] . It appears that adding the axiom (Bcp -+ BKip) to KBCD yields (K<p <-^ Btp), which is clearly undesirable. We will develop some techniques (in Section 4) to study this problem systematically, and suggest some solutions. These techniques are presented in a slightly more general setting than needed for this problem only, but the generalizations are obtained in a very natural way.
In Section 2 we introduce KBCD and show the system in action by deriving some theorems. We will briefly discuss the impact of some of the properties of KBCD on the notions of knowledge and belief. In Section 3 we give a Kripke semantics for a 'finitary part' of the logic, and prove completeness: in particular, we will construct a canonical model; this construction will be used throughout the paper to obtain completeness results for modified systems as well. In Section 4 we systematically investigate the impact of particular axioms on the canonical models (for those axioms). It will appear, that these correspondences are not hard to prove, but are, at the same time, easily transferable to more specific cases. It gives us an alternative way to derive KBCDtheorems, and also enables us to prove that some formulas are not theorems.
In Section 5 we discuss the problem that we mentioned above: adding (Bip -y BKip) to KBCD yields (Kip f+ Bip). In Section 6, properties like positive and negative introspection (and 'extraspection') are introduced. From Section 4 we know how these properties are related with the Kripke structure, so that we can investigate which properties KBCD does not have. It will turn out that KBCD is 'saturated' with respect to introspection and extraspection properties: adding any of them to KBCD yields (Kip <-• Bip). We show how one can define systems for knowledge and belief with various degrees of introspection, without having (Kip <-> Bip). In Section 7 we give some conclusions.
2 KBCD as a basis for knowledge and belief Kraus and Lehmann [19] introduced a system (which we will denote with KBCD) that can deal with knowledge and belief simultaneously. They used 2n operators K\,..., K n , B\,..., B n , modelling the knowledge and belief of n agents from an index set People = { 1 , . . . , n}. In general, given a set P of propositional atoms and O of operators, a language L(P, 0) is the smallest set 5 3 P which is closed both under infix attachment of A, V, -i, and «-»•, and prefix placing of -> and operators 0 6 0. For the moment, our language KBCD for KBCD is L(P, 0 ) , where P is a set of atoms and 0 = {C, D, E, F, K{, B<|i < n } . If | 0 | > 1, we say to have a multi modal logic. In the sequel, if we write K, or B{, i is a member of People. The system KBCD has four levels, the first of which is a propositional one:
(AO) Any axiomatization of the propositional calculus (RO) h ip, \-ip -tip =>\-ip.
Next, there is a level concerning properties of knowledge (Ki) and common knowledge (C).
Eip (everybody knows that ip) is defined as follows: Eip = K\ip A K 2 <p A . . . A K n ip. Cip is supposed to mean (Eip A EEip A . . . ) . Somewhat surprisingly, this infinite conjunction can be axiomatized. PROOF. Here, we omit the simple, but tedious proof by induction on the complexity of (p, which should be preceded by an inductive definition of substitution. I
The following theorem shows that the notions of knowledge and belief, as defined in KBCD (and considered separately) have at least the properties of those in 55 and weak 55, respectively (cf. the introduction, or [9, 23, 24] ). LEMMA 2.2 In the system KBCD, knowledge (Ki) has all the properties of 55 whereas belief (B t ) has those of weak 55.
PROOF. Modus ponens is immediate from RO. Also, Rl, (h tp =*• h dp), together with A5 ((-Cip -» Eip) and the definition of We say that an operator D is a (normal) modal operator (in L) if it satisfies:
distribution Moreover, we call a modal logic L normal if it contains AO, RO, necessitation and distribution. LEMMA 2.4 The operators K it Bi, C, D, E and F are all normal modal operators in KBCD-
The observation above immediately follows from the definition of E and F and the axioms of KBCD- This implies that we may apply our modal intuitions to derive several properties of our operators. To mention some, we have h tp
When we want to use such properties for • (e.g. when deriving some if-BcD-theorems (2.8)), we refer to them as 2.5. These properties naturally provide some attributes for the epistemic operators they are supposed to model; for a discussion we refer to [13] . THEOREM 2.6 In [19] , it is claimed (not proven) that KBCD has the following theorems:
Where in this logic, knowledge and belief are defined as separate entities with some interaction (A14-A16) axioms, an alternative approach is to take one of the two as basic, and connect the two in one fundamental definition. A popular direction follows the slogan 'knowledge = justified, true belief (already advocated in the 1960s by e.g. [21] ), but an opposite view is taken in [27] , where belief (or rather B(tp, tp a , 3 ), the belief in tp relative to some 'unusuality assertion' tp a , s ) is defined in terms of knowledge. In [27] it is shown that, when S5 is taken for knowledge, the /fD45-properties for belief follows from their fundamental definition! The same even holds for the interaction axioms A14 and A15 of KBCD and the theorems T1-T7 (T8 can be shown to be also valid in their approach). However, from their proofs it follows that when the B-operator occurs more then once in a theorem, it is assumed that all the unusuallity assertions are the same. To see our system KBCD in action, we provide a derivation for T8. For a proof of the other theorems of 2.6, we refer to [13] . PROPOSITION 2.8 The following proves T8: PROOF.
1.
Bnp++KiBitp A2, A15
B x {Bitp^tp) 9, AO, RO Note how first negative introspection for Bi is derived (5), which then immediately (using only propositional logic and modal observations for Bi) yields the result. We will later also argue semantically (as a consequence of 4.5), that 10 follows directly from 5.
We mentioned already in the introduction that one typical property that distinguishes knowledge from belief is that knowledge is veridical, i.e. known facts are true. Although this property does not hold for belief, T8 expresses that agent i believes that it does hold; B{{Bnp -»tp). Note that T8 implies that, by definition of F, we also have h B,(Fip -> <p). Since this is true for arbitrary i G People, we have
expressing that everybody believes that 'the belief of everybody' is also veridical. In the system KBCD, knowledge is stronger than belief, which is expressed by A14, K t tp -* Bitp. A14 seems perfectly reasonable 1 (but cf. also [28] ). Of course, one does not want knowledge and belief to collapse, so in particular, we do not want A14': Bi^p -¥ K t ip. For one class of formulas, however, belief and knowledge are the same. DEFINITION 2.9 A formula with occurrences of Ki or B l is called an epistemic formula. The belief set (knowledge set) of an agent t in a system L is defined as {(p\L h Bi<p}({ip\L h Knp}). A formula tp is i-doxastic sequenced if there are ip, operators Xi,... X n £ {K t ,B t , -</£',, ->Bi} and n > 0 such that tp = XiX 2 •.. X n ip . We will not always mention reference to agent t. THEOREM 2.10 For any i-doxastic sequenced tp, we have: 
Kripke semantics for KB
In this section we introduce a semantics for ifScD-like systems. Unlike the completeness proof of [19] , which is based on the construction of a 'universal model' using labelled traces, we will construct a 'canonical model' for any consistent formula tp, thus applying ideas from classical modal logic (cf. [4, 18] ). To emphasize that the structure of a model for a particular system heavily depends on the specific axioms of that system, we start out with a kind of 'barest' model. Moreover, since in this paper the notions of knowledge and belief (and their interactions) are our primary concern, we start out by simplifying KBCD'-in the sequel, we will not consider 'common knowledge' or 'common belief any longer. This enlightens our considerations on completeness substantially (cf. 3.12, 3.15). The system KB is a logic in the language KB = L(P,{.ftr t , Bi, E, F}). It consists of the axioms A0-A3, A8-A9, and A14-A15. As inference rules it has R0 and Necessitation for K. From now, we will use 'h' and '\~KB' interchangeably.
As a consequence of 3.2 we know that the theorems T1-T8 are derivable in KB. DEFINITION 3.3 A Kripke model M for a modal language L with one modal operator D is a tuple (W, R, TT), where W is a set of worlds, R C W x W a binary relation, and TT : W -¥ P -¥ {true, false} a truth assignment to the prepositional atoms for each world w £ W. Truth definition for tp G L at w, written (A4, w) ^= (p, is:
We say that an operator that is defined like D for R, is a necessity operator for R. For any modal operator D, we define Q = -i D ->. D is called the possibility operator for R. We then say that (p is satisfiable if ip is true at some world w in some model M, <p is true in model M (M (= tp) if {M,w) ^= tp for all worlds of M, and, finally, tp is valid ((= tp) if it is true in all models. For any class C of models, we write ^c tp if ip is true in all models in C.
As is easily verified, we have (|= tp =» \= Dtp) and (|= O(tp -> rp) -> (Dtp -> Dt/0)-Since also all prepositional tautologies and modus ponens are valid, this explains why Kripke structures are so suitable for interpreting modal formulas: necessitation and distribution are valid. To summarize, we have the following (K is the 'minimal' normal modal logic). LEMMA 3.4 For all tp G L, h/<-tp =>• \= tp.
The proof of the converse, (which is equivalent to saying that K-consistent formulas are satisfiable (in some Kripke model)) is also a fact from the modal logic folklore. However, for future reference, we will sketch the idea of the proof (and the construction of the model). This construction is known as the Henkin construction, and takes full benefit of the similarity between properties of maximal consistent sets on the syntactic side (3.5) and the truth definition of formulas in a world on the model-theoretic side (3.3). We only give a short sketch here, the reader is referred to [4, 18] or [7] for further details. We start out by repeating the notion of maximal consistent sets.
Due to a theorem of Lindenbaum (cf. [3] ), such maximal consistent sets do exist for the logic KB and its variants that we discuss here. Moreover, each consistent formula <p is contained in a m.c. set. We assume familiarity with m.c. sets (cf. [4, 18] ), but summarize their vital properties in Lemma 3.5. Then we proceed by giving the definition of the canonical model for a (normal) modal logic (3.6) and recall some of its properties in 3.7. These notions and results will be needed in the sequel. Let L be any normal modal logic (cf. 2.3). Then:
1. Every L-consistent set $ can be extended to a m.c. set E 2. Suppose S is m.c. in L. Then:
The canonical model
for a modal logic L is defined as follows:
For all tp and m.c. sets E £ M c :
LEMMA 3.8 ('fundamental theorem' [4, 18] ) \=ipiff<pe E. \-K tpifi \=<p.
Now we start to rig our bare model to models for KB. Of course we have to add a number of binary relations, so that our .ft'.B-models will be tuples
where 5 , is the relation for K t , T{ for S,-, SE for E, and Tp for F, respectively. More interestingly, we will see that the axioms of KB force special properties upon those relations (in the canonical model). EXAMPLE 3.10 As an easy example, consider the axiom K t ip -y B t ip. In M c this leads to: T^TA «=> {<p\Bnp € r} c A => {<p\Ki<p e r} c A ^ S.TA.
We denote the class ofKB-models with K.B. THEOREM 3.12 Each i^B-consistent formula is satisfied in some £B-model.
PROOF. If (p is ifB-consistent, it is contained in some KB-m.c. set T. So it is true in (M c , T).
We thus only have to show that M c is a model in KB, i.e. that it satisfies 1-5 of 3.11.
1. Sf is an equivalence: 5, c is reflexive, SflT, by definition of S£ and, using A2, Knp € F < / ? E F. It is seen to be transitive, by an argument similar to that in the proof of item 4 of this theorem. Finally, it is symmetric: suppose SJTA, i.e. 5. Since h Etp -> Knp, as in 3.10, we conclude S\ C S C E for all i < n, and hence 5f U . . . U S ; C S | . Now suppose S% <£ Sf U . . . U S£, then for some A : S%TA and for no i < n, we have SfTA. Then, for all i < n, there is some (pi for which K x tpi G F, but tpi & A. The former gives us Ki(tpiV.. -Vtp n ) € F for alii < n (and hence E{ip\ V.. .Vtp n ) € F), and the latter ((piV...Vv? n ) £ A (cf. 3.5.2b). This contradicts S | F A , so S | C SfU...L)S£.l
In [9] , it is claimed that, if we would add the axioms for C to the S5-logic for knowledge, the necessity operator for C may be seen as the transitive reflexive closure of S&, i.e., Rcuv iff there is some S^-path from u to v. From [7] , where a similar operator (D*) is studied in the area of dynamic logic, we know that the canonical model for such a system need not have this property. However, the canonical model is transferred into a finite model, which then is still a model of the proper kind and in which the relation that belongs to • * is the reflexive transitive closure of the relation for • . It may be shown that for KBQD there are similar problems, but also that a finite canonical model (of the appropriate kind) can be obtained in this case (cf. [17] ). However, for the sequel, we need the unaffected canonical model as defined in 3.6.
Note how the particular properties of the binary relations in the canonical model are guaranteed by particular axioms of our logic. For instance, A2, Knp -> <p forces Si to be reflexive, (3.12.1) and the definition of E guarantees that E may be understood as the necessity operator for the union of the operators Si for K t . We emphasize that although K,<p -> tp is true on all S^-reflexive models, the converse is not true: let M consist of two worlds u and v, with 5, = {(u, v), (v, u)} and vr(u) = n{v). Then, M is not reflexive and still M \= K x ip -> tp, because of a particular property of a particular TT. TO abstract from the actual assignment 7r, the notion of frame is introduced, on which the interaction between axioms and properties on the binary relation can be studied more clearly. DEFINITION 3.13 A frame T is a Kripke model without valuation
We write T (= <p iff for all TT, (J",7r> |= ip. If $ is any (first-order) property of T, we say that multi modal formula <p (which is generally understood to be a schema) corresponds with $, if T |= <p O-T satisfies <£. We then write ip ~c o $. If this is only true for frames T in some class V of frames, we say that we have relative correspondence (<P ~co(D) *)• Fo f an introduction to this topic, we refer to [2] . We denote the class of models based on T by M(!F). A given model M. is understood to be based on its underlying frame J~M : th e underlying frame of the canonical model is called the canonical frame. Finally, we say that a logic L is sound and complete with respect to V, or (L \-tp o \=v <p) if for all T in V, L \-tp <=> T |= ip (we then say that T is a frame for L). DEFINITION 3.14 Let ML be some multi modal language for a normal modal logic L. We say that (the scheme) tp € ML is canonical (can(y>)) if the canonical frame for L satisfies tp.
As is known, (and as will be a consequence of the following section), on the level of frames, A2 does correspond to reflexivity. From 3.12.1 we know that S t c in the canonical model for KB is reflexive (forced by A2), and thus the canonical frame is. Since A2 ~c o reflexivity, we conclude that A2 is canonical. We stress that in general, the fact that an axiom A corresponds to property $ is not equivalent to saying that A is canonical 2 . We know that A5 A A6 A A7 corresponds to the property that 5 c (the relation for which C is the necessity operator) is the reflexive transitive closure of SE, whereas the canonical model for KB need not have this property at all (cf. [7, 17] ). Conversely, it may be that the canonical frame has some property $ that is 'coincidental', i.e. that is not forced by any axiom. As an example, we saw that (A2 A A3) (<p) forces 5f to be an equivalence relation. If n -1, since V = {Kip, p) and A' = {Ki~>p, ->p} are both consistent sets, they give rise to worlds F and A which are not 5 c -accessible from each other. In other words, in the canonical frame 3x3y(-<Sxy A -I 5 J / I ) ( $ ) is true, although this property does not correspond to any modal formula (If T = ({w}, {(w,w)}), then T (= tp, but T ^ $)• It will appear that all the multi-modal schemes tp in which we are interested here, are canonical. REMARK 3.15 The fact that no modal formula (p corresponds to a given -i$ is sometimes exploited to make a shift from a class of models C for which some logic L is a complete axiomatization, to the class of models in C that do satisfy <£ (and for which L is still a complete axiomatization)! For instance, on 55-frames, -<ixVy(Sxy A Syx) does not (relatively) correspond to any <p; however, a move from the canonical model for 55 to generated models gives models for which VxVy(Sxy A Syx) holds (cf. [23, 24] ). Similarly, adding (KiipV.. .VK n ip) ->• Drp (where the operator D denotes 'distributed knowledge' cf. [9] or [14] in which this operator was represented with / ) to our logic KB would not give immediately a canonical model for which 5ifl.. .nS n = So holds (cf. [14] ), where So is the accessibility relation for which D is the necessity operator. Now, the fact that Si n . . . n S n ^ 5 / ( = -><!>) is not multi modally definable may be used to knead this canonical model into a model for which $ is true, so that completeness of KB U {(Kirp V . . . V K n rp) -*• Drp} with respect to ^-models can be obtained (cf. [14] ). REMARK 3.16 A typical question we want to address using this machinery is the following. Suppose we have some epistemic logic KB* and we want to know whether adding one of our favourite properties for knowledge and belief implies having to accept another, perhaps less preferable property, i.e. we ask whether
The answer is positive, if, for example, we can show that can (ipi), and find $ i and 3>j such that Vi ~co $i.V2 ~c o $2. and $ i => $2-It is negative if we can find $h with ^h ~co $h (h = 1,2) and a if i?*-frame for $ i that does not satisfy $2, a question about first-order properties on Kripke frames. (Note that the seemingly semantical question whether the canonical model for KB* U {(pi} is a model for (^2 has a syntactical back bone: the answer is no iff -np2 is true at some world in /A c iff (by the fundamental theorem) -up? is consistent in KB* U {ipi}.)
We end this section by mentioning an alternative semantics for our notions of knowledge and belief. In [8] , Halpern shows that probabilistic Kripke models are also suitable to interpret 55-like knowledge or KD45-\ike belief. Such a model (for simplicity, we assume to have only one agent) M is of the form M = (W, P, n), where W is a finite or countably infinite set (of, again, worlds) and P: V{W) -> [0,1] is a discrete probability function. In particular, Dip is true at w iffP({u|(A/\t;) f= <p}) = 1 (cf. also [12, 22] ). It appears that, when no additional constraints are made upon P, the logic for ' • ' is just KD45, so that, in that case, 'belief is the same as 'certainty'. If we want that 'certainty' is 'knowledge', we have to import the property O<p -> ip, which is valid if we additionally assume that P satisfies VwP(w) > 0. In other words, B<p A -up is satisfiable in world w, iff the measure of w equals 0 (and w is not taken into account when verifying B<p at w). The techniques that we develop in the following section to characterize several properties for knowledge and belief, are easily extended to the models of this kind (which we make clear at the end of Section 4).
Some correspondence results
In this section, we will prove (among other properties) that axiom A15: Bi<p -¥ K x Bi<p corresponds with ViVyVz(5jij/ A Tiyz -> Tixz). Given this, it is not difficult to see that T4: Knp -¥ BiK t <p corresponds with VxVyVz(TiXy A S t yz -> Sixz), (an interchange of the KiS and B{S induces an interchange of the SiS and T,s) and also that (K t <p ->• K l K l (p) corresponds with VxVyVz(Siiy A Siyz -> S{xz), transitivity of Si (replacing Bi by Ki induces a replacement of T, by 5,). Obviously, inferring the last mentioned correspondence from one of the first two is easy, whereas the other way around is a much more difficult, if not impossible, task. So, for correspondence-problems, it would be nice having different operators for each occurrence in formulas like A15. DEFINITION 
Then, for all x € {a, ...,h}:
1. as a scheme, 4.3.x corresponds with 4.2.x 2. axiom 4.3.x is canonical. PROOF. A proof for 1 is obtained by generalizing well known correspondence results for (standard) modal logic (cf. [2, 18] ). In fact, both 1 and 2 follow from a theorem ascribed to Sahlqvist, but proven independently in [26] and [1] (cf. also [25] ). Here we do not need that full machinery, but prove 1 (d), as an example. For item 2, one needs generalizations of the construction in Section 3, from which the results for (a), (b), (c) and (g) are immediately obtained. To illustrate an existential quantified case, we prove 2(e) as a generalisation of a proof in [7] . We like to stress that the proofs for these general cases ('fresh' operators for each occurrence) are not more complicated than in the standard modal case. 
for all frames T and world x € T, (F>x) \=(piff(T,x) \= <p{x). Then, K*<p corresponds locally with "iy{R { xy -+ <f>(y)) (and so, globally with VxVy(i?*xy
One can now systematically list all the properties that the relations 5, and T< of the frames in K.B satisfy, by investigating the axioms involving K{ and Bj. For instance, for transitivity, we get, that from the c-part of 4. (2) . By reflexivity, Rxx (3). Euclidicity, (1) and (3) give Ryx (4). This proves symmetry of it. Finally, (2), (4) l(b and d) to conclude that S, on this frame is both reflexive and Euclidean, and thus, by 4.5.1, symmetric. By 4.3.l(h), we know that the canonical frame (and hence, also the canonical model) for KB satisfies ip -> Ki-iK^ip; so, using the fundamental theorem (3.8) we observe that <p ->• Ki->Ki-np is contained in every KB-maximal consistent set and hence, by 3.
3.1, it follows that Si and T, are transitive (from Lemma 2.2 and T6). T{ is transitive over (Si,Ti) (A15), Si is 'maximally transitive': it is transitive over (5,, Si), over (T,, S,) (T4), over (S t ) T.) (because
Note that, in a similar way, we conclude that 5, is transitive, so that we again have a proof of positive introspection for K x . Whereas in 2.2, we argued that A2 and A3 were sufficient to derive the same result within KB, we now semantically use $2 and #3 with A2 ~c o <f> 2 and A3 ~c o $3 to find a $ with ( $ 2 A $3) => $ and $ ~c o Knp -> KiKup. There is a similar correspondence between the proof of negative belief introspection in 2.2. and deriving Euclidicity for Ti from 4.5.2. Finally,notethat4.5.3givesusT8again: since VxVy(TiXy -4 T x yy) is derived for Ti, using 4.4 we conclude that B{(Bi<p -> (p) is derivable in KB; which we indeed showed in 2.8.
In particular, note that the T;s in the frames of KB are also transitive, Euclidean and dense (this follows from 4.3 together with T6 ('-)•'), T7 ('-»') and T6 ('<-') of 2.6, respectively). In the opposite direction, one can make an exhaustive list of properties of 4.2 for the frames in K.B (which immediately proves the following theorem), and use the absence of special properties in K.B to show non-derivability in KB. For example, Ti is not transitive over (Ti, S t ) and also not over (Si, Si) . By way of example, we prove the former. Figure 1 is a £/3-structure, in which Ti is denoted with thick, and 5^ with thin arrows, respectively. Note that although T{uv and S x vw are true in that structure, Tiuw is not.
FIG. 1. A ACB-structure, in which 5, is denoted with thin, and T x with thick arrows, respectively
From the previous paragraph, we get a lot of non-theorems of KB: in particular, because T, is not transitive over (Ti, Si), we have KB 1/ £<</? -> BiKitp. We give a list (writing '\f tp' instead of 'KB \f tp') of non-derivable formulas that are important when studying knowledge and belief (cf. the introduction, 4.7, and, for a classification, Section 6). We end this section with the following aside. The correspondences that are obtained here, can directly be transformed to the general probability structures (g.p.s.) as introduced in [8] 
Conscious beliefs, believed consciousness
Our system KB verifies A15: Bnp -* KiB t tp (beliefs are 'conscious', in the sense of 'known'). This demonstrates that Bi represents a rather explicit belief, in the sense that the agent is aware of adopting them-the terms 'explicit belief and 'implicit belief are introduced in [22] and also used in [20] ; in [5, 15] these notions are related to 'awareness'. Here, one may just associate 'implicit' with 'weak' and 'explicit' with 'strong'. Knowledge might be considered a very explicit notion of belief. If Bi would represent a notion of implicit belief, it seems reasonable to let (B t tp A Bi-*tp) be satisfiable simultaneously with ->B l L (cf [15] ; however, at this point, our use of 'implicit belief diverges from that in [5, 20, 22] , where it is assumed to be some logically closed set of beliefs-facts that implicitly follow from the agent's beliefs, although he need not be aware of it). But assuming (satisfiability of) (Bitp A B x -*p), A15 would yield Ki (B{tpABi-up) . This again demonstrates that A15 is reasonable for explicit beliefs (in our sense); if agent i knows that he has inconsistent beliefs, he should retract some of them.
Kraus and Lehmann remark that it would be interesting to also have Bnp -> BiKiip, implying that agent i believes that his beliefs are conscious. (In Section 6, we pay some more attention to the kinds of belief these two formulas would apply to.) However, adding B t ip -¥ BiKiip to KB would give B t ip -¥ Kiip. Now, we concentrate on finding KB-\\ke systems that do allow B x ip -> B t Ki<p, without yielding (Bi<p *+ K x ip). (We will say that such a system solves the B(elieved) C(onsciousness) of B(eliefs) problem.) The latter property (r-K,ip <-> Bnp) corresponds with S t = T,, for which we will give a sufficient condition. Recall from Theorem 4. Summarizing, Theorem 5.1.1 implies that, in order to add (B t tp -> BiKiip) and at the same time avoiding (B t tp = Knp), it is necessary to give up one of A3, A9 and A14, whereas 5.1.2 expresses that this may also be sufficient (whether this is indeed so, depends on the axioms we do add to such a system; in the sequel, we will investigate several possibilities).
Giving up A14, Knp -y Bi<p, or semantically, T< C 5^, makes (K t p A ->Bip), and even (Kip A Bi~<p) satisfiable. Then, Bj represents an implicit notion of belief-a notion that we studied in [15] -and then the whole system KB needs revision. (See also [28] for an epistemic logic in which {Knp -+ Bnp) is not valid.) We doubt whether, for instance, A15 would be FIG. 2. A structure in which 5 is denoted with thin, and T with thick arrows a desirable property for implicit belief, and probably the same holds for B,ip -+ B x K x p, the formula that urged us to drop A14 in the first place.
One could also give up A9, but similar remarks as in the previous paragraph can be made here. For instance, from A15, we get Bijd.se -> KiBiJalse, but why should an agent hold on to false beliefs if he knows he has them? Moreover, dropping ->BiJalse cannot invalidate -iBiJalse -> (K x p <-> Bip). So, either agent i beliefs in falsehood, or his beliefs equal his knowledge. Dropping A3, -<Kip -> K t -<Ki<p is the third alternative. Note that a knowledge agent that satisfies A3 is very much aware of all the facts that are around: if he does not know (p, he knows that he does not. This would imply, that a Bantu tribesman knows that he does not know that personal computer prices are going down. For a discussion about 'awareness', we refer to [5] , where the Bantu tribesman example is taken from, and to [15] .
From Remark 2.2, we know that -<Knp -> K t ->Knp (A3) implies Knp -> KiK t tp (A3'). We could try to see what happens if we replace A3 by A3' (a discussion on these axioms can already be found in [10] ). We know that A3' corresponds with transitivity of S,. DEFINITION 5.3 Let KB~ be the system consisting of all the axioms of KB, but with A3 replaced by A3': K x tp -> KiK t ip and with A17 : B,(p -¥ B,K x p, added to it.
PROOF. TO prove this, from arguments given in this section, it is clear that it is sufficient to find a K.B~ model M in which the S<s are reflexive and transitive, the T,s are serial and transitive (not Euclidean; note that 4.5.2 cannot be applied in K.B~),T X C 5, and in which the T^s are transitive over both (Si,Ti) and (7 1 ,, Si), but at the same time Si g Ti. Such a structure is given in Fig. 2 . I
From the model of Fig. 2 , we see that, since Ti is not Euclidean over (S<, 7j), we also have KB~ \f ->Bnp -> K l -'B x <p. We will investigate the (non-) theorems of 'KB-\ike systems' a bit more systematically in the next section. Of course, it is easy to define a system that does not verify Bnp -> Knp but that does yield A15 and A17. However, we want a system S that is *close(st) to KB U {-417}' and such that 5 \f B{tp o Knp. For such an 5, some theorems of KB must be sacrificed. For example, BiKup -> Knp (implied by T4), with Bnp -»• BiKup immediately yields B t (f -> Knp. In order to study these problems more systematically and to get a clearer notion of 'close to KB' we will explore the fact that we now know how the properties of knowledge and belief, as expressed in the axioms and theorems T1-T10 of KB act upon the structure of its Kripke models.
Introspection and extraspection
Now, before we take up the BCB-problem itself, we will investigate some general properties of knowledge and belief. We will see how they are present in KB, and we show some combinations of those properties that are possible in a system that defines knowledge and belief as two necessity operators. Note that all the axioms and theorems that were discussed or given in Section 2 were equivalent to either an /T-formula, or of one of the forms Xip -*• Yip and Xtp -> ip. THEOREM 6.2 In any system, if (K{ip -¥ B,<p) (A14)is valid, each class of IT is partially ordered, withy) < tp iff tp =*Mi4 i> • For each class of IT, there is a smallest element (modulo equivalence). In the next paragraphs, we will spend some words on positive introspection, followed by a paragraph about negative introspection. The discussion can easily be extended to the other inspection properties. To start, we want to point out the difference between (Xtp -» YZip) and Y(Xtp -> Zip). Note that the latter is purely a property of y-beliefs, whereas one could interpret the former as a property noted by an observer from outside. The positive introspection formula (Xip -> 5^2^) has, if (AV -• ^¥>) ' s valid, as a strongest instantiation (By? -> KKtp), and as its weakest (A"<^ -> BBip). For 'ordinary' belief and knowledge, the first is indeed too strong. The latter presumes introspection in one's own beliefs. We doubt, however, whether people use phrases like 'I believe that I believe that...', and if so, they probably mean 'I very weakly believe that...'. It would be interesting to have a system with two (possibly the same) notions of belief, say explicit belief (B e ) and implicit belief (B*), such that (B'B'ip A ->B e <p) is satisfiable. Because Kip -> • KKip is true for most notions of knowledge, it seems reasonable to expect that {Bip -¥ BKip) is true for notions of belief that resemble knowledge, i.e. for strong notions of belief. We can be a bit more precise here, and ask for which X and Y, (X(p ->• YK(p) should be true. We might expect (Xip -¥ YKip) to hold for 'strong' X-belief, and 'weak' F-belief. For instance, the choices X = 'I am convinced' and Y = 'I suspect' is a more acceptable than the other way around. (In KB, (K<p -* BKip) is valid, whereas (Bcp -> KK<p) is not.)
Instead of 'strong' belief, we could also write 'expensive' (having serious consequences, e.g. the belief of a judge or surgeon), and instead of 'weak' we could say 'cheap' (e.g. the belief of some gossip-paper). (The introspection property B<p -> KBip seems desirable when B denotes an 'expensive' belief; for instance, if a judge believes that females are bad car-drivers, he had better know that he believes so when he has to judge about Alice's role in an accident.) Furthermore, {Bip -+ BKip) models the attitude of an agent who thinks (believes) that he is very critical in adopting beliefs: he only believes ip if he believes that he knows ip.
However, (Btp -> BKip) is not a property of all notions of belief. For instance, we can imagine a mathematician believing Fermat's theorem is true, without believing that he knows it is true. Moreover, -'(Btp -4 BKip) might be satisfiable in systems that interpret belief as a 'practical, working belief. If I leave home on a bright day, I may adopt the working belief that it will not rain that day (so leave my raincoat at home), although I need not believe that I know that it will stay dry. Also, it seems that, if B is interpreted as some religious belief, (Bip -> BKip) need not hold: (Bip A ->BK<p -> B-^Kip) as its weakest. Negative introspection is closely related to the problem of 'awareness' (cf. [5, 15] ). ->Xip could be true because the agent is not aware of <p. Now, if Y is the belief or knowledge of the same agent, and (pXtp -> Y-'Zip) is true, he becomes aware of tp. Note that A3 (->K<p -t K-iKip) is a strong property of knowledge: by contraposition, it implies, that the agent's ignorance of his ignorance is sufficient to have knowledge:
The following theorem says that KB is saturated with respect to the classes of IT (cf. Definition 6.1). THEOREM 6.3 KB is maximal in the sense that adding any introspection, extraspection or trust formula to it makes Bnp <-> K,<p a theorem.
PROOF. We carry out the proof for the classes of introspection formulas; the other cases are similar. Due to the previous theorem, in each class we can find some 'weakest' formulas that are not KBtheorems yet. The weakest p.i. • Now we have some more equipment to look at our BCB-problem again. DEFINITION 6.4 Let KB + be the system KB \ {AZ} together with:
Here, we will not discuss whether KB + models some interesting notion of belief and knowledge. Technically, we can relate KB + with KB in terms of the notions developed in this section. The basic idea behind KB + is that it solves the BCB-problem and is quite similar to KB. An important reference for this similarity is IT. In Definition 6.4 we take benefit of the nice order in each of the /T-classes. We defined KB + such that it has the same /T-properties as KB, with (Bnp -> B x K x tp) added to it, and formulas that yield 
KB+ h B^Bitp -4 K t <p), but KB \f B { {Bnp -4 K iV >).
Solving the BCB-problem boils down to investigating the possibility of having certain combinations of /T-formulas. Of course, one can do this independently from the BCB-problem and study what kind of i^B-Iike systems are possible anyhow. For instance, one might want a modal system modelling knowledge and belief of two agents (KB2)-Then, one might assume maximal p.i. properties (in KB2, this amounts to KhSP -> KiKjtp,h,i,j £ {1,2}: if one agent knows tp, they both know that they both know <p) and wonder what properties can be added to them, without implying a collapse of both operators. We end this section with a theorem about possible combinations. THEOREM 6.8 Consider the following 'extreme systems' PI, NI, PE and NE, which are systems with two epistemic operators B and K satisfying AO, RO, Rl (for K), Al and A8 of KB, and such that: 
Conclusions and problems
Studying the BCB-problem, I applied some correspondence theory to multi-modal epistemic logic. Studying this multi-modal system, possible combinations of epistemic properties could be examined systematically. With this general approach I showed that Kraus and Lehmann's KB is saturated with respect to many important properties (such as introspection): adding any of them to KB yields Bi<p «4 Knp. I investigated one of the many possible systems that are 'close to KB' and that solves the BCB-problem. This shows that the collapse of knowledge and belief one obtains by adding B(p -t BKtp is not caused by the use of Kripke semantics. I argued that the techniques presented in this paper can straightforwardly be applied to probabilistic Kripke structures as well.
By allowing more epistemic operators (for each agent), many notions of belief can be combined. It seems interesting to explore this idea of having a spectrum of beliefs, ranging from weak belief, corresponding with having less alternatives (worlds) in the structure (cf. [15] , where a notion of belief is defined as a possibility operator) to knowledge as some 'limit'. This idea might be extended to do a kind of 'quantitative reasoning' as follows. With respect to a relation R, define operators L n , n G l N , with interpretation of L n tp : 'in all, except for at most n worlds, ip is the case'. This enables defining notions like V is believed at least as strong as ip'. At the moment, I are studying some interesting perspectives offered by this option. The idea of having such 'numerical' modal operators was suggested independently in [6] and [11] . A first application to epistemic logic is to be found in [16] .
